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Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for the opportunity to
speak with you about the legal and, indeed, philosophical issues with
which we are grappling today and will certainly grapple in the coming
years. Before proceeding, let me state for the record that I am giving
you my personal opinion, and not necessarily that of the U.S. govern-
ment or any of its instrumentalities.
Let me begin with the observation that the cyber world in all its
many dimensions is embedded in virtually all national security is-
sues.1 Consider that the Department of Defense ("DoD") defines
cyberspace as the "global domain within the information environment
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1. The importance of cyberspace to our national security is recognized at the highest
levels of government: "Our Nation's critical infrastructures consist of the physi-
cal and cyber assets of public and private institutions in several sectors: agricul-
ture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense
industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation,
banking and finance, chemicals and hazardous materials, and postal and ship-
ping. Cyberspace is the nervous system of these infrastructures-the control sys-
tem of our country. Cyberspace comprises hundreds of thousands of
interconnected computers, servers, routers, switches, and fiber optic cables that
make our critical infrastructures work. Thus, the healthy functioning of cyber-
space is essential to our economy and our national security." NATIONAL STRATEGY
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consisting of the interdependent network of information technology in-
frastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks,
computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers." 2
Obviously, there is hardly any aspect of modern military opera-
tions that fails to involve cyberspace in some way, and much the same
can be said about our economy 3 and, indeed, our way of life.
Defending our way of life is the raison d'tre of America's armed
forces.4 This brings me, however, to my first point, and this is simply
that because a particular cyber-related matter has a national security
dimension does not mean, necessarily, that it is appropriate for the
armed forces to address.
I believe that in the twenty-first century, national security chal-
lenges do require a national response. We need to bring all elements
of national power to bear and that, by definition, requires robust in-
volvement of agencies and entities outside the DoD. This is particu-
larly important in the context of cyber matters. Much of what
transpires in the cyber realm that concerns us does not resemble
traditional military threats.5 That is something of an issue because
our legal architecture for the law of war is built upon the concept of
traditional military threats.
TO SECURE CYBERSPACE Vii (2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace-
strategy.pdf.
2. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS 141 (2001), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new-pubs/jpl02.
pdf.
3. "By 2003, our economy and national security became fully dependent upon infor-
mation technology and the information infrastructure. A network of networks
directly supports the operation of all sectors of our economy-energy (electric
power, oil and gas), transportation (rail, air, merchant marine), finance and
banking, information and telecommunications, public health, emergency ser-
vices, water, chemical, defense industrial base, food, agriculture, and postal and
shipping. The reach of these computer networks exceeds the bounds of cyber-
space. They also control physical objects such as electrical transformers, trains,
pipeline pumps, chemical vats, and radars." NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE
CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 6.
4. "The Armed Forces fulfill unique and crucial roles, defending the United States
against all adversaries and serving the Nation as a bulwark and the guarantors
of its security and independence. When called to action, the Armed Forces sup-
port and defend national interests worldwide." JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DOCTRINE
FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES i (2007), http://www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/jel/new-pubs/jpl.pdf.
5. Such cyber threats to national security can take a variety of forms: "[Small
groups or individuals] can attack vulnerable points in cyberspace and disrupt
commerce and daily life in the United States, causing economic damage, compro-
mising sensitive information and materials, and interrupting critical services
such as power and information networks. National security and domestic re-
sources may be at risk...." DEP'T OF DEFENSE, 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRAT-
EGY 7 (2008), http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/2008NationalDefenseStrategy.pdf.
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As I will discuss in a moment, that does not mean, however, that
all the laws and treaties are irrelevant; rather, it means that it takes
hard work and innovative analysis to apply existing law to emerging
cyber issues.
For example, one of the central issues-a truly perennial one-is
when does a specific cyber activity constitute the kind of peril that
makes it appropriate for a national security response as opposed to a
law enforcement response? This is not a new issue; as an aside, I
wrote an article about this subject in 1996, yet here we are today still
wrestling with it.6
I am an adherent of the "Schmitt test," which was enunciated in a
1999 law review article by Michael N. Schmitt, a retired Air Force
judge advocate. 7 What he does, as many of you know, is lay out a
number of factors to consider.8 The aim of this analysis is to deter-
mine when the consequences of a particular cyber event have an effect
that mirrors that of a traditional kinetic attack. If it does, the whole
panoply of the law of war may apply.9
Sounds simple? The concept is simple, but its application is com-
plicated because it requires subjective and qualitative judgments that,
like so many judgments in the military and diplomacy realms, reside
in an arena of imperfect information and grey areas.
The only solution to this is to attempt to work through various sce-
narios in exercises and other controlled situations so that we can de-
velop robust ways of thinking about the criteria, and figure out the
6. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Cyber Attack! Are We at War?, J. NAT'L COMPUTER SECUR-
ITY ASS'N, Nov. 1996, at 18.
7. Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in Interna-
tional Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L.
885 (1999).
8. Id. at 935. Professor Schmitt sets forth a multi-factor test for analyzing a com-
puter network attack under international law, with a particular view toward the
United Nations Charter. His analysis turns on such questions as whether an
attack is "intended to directly cause physical damage to objects or injury to
human beings," "whether the consequences of the attack track those consequence
commonalities which characterize armed force," and whether principles such as
self-defense are applicable. Id. Professor Schmitt's test uses similar questions in
order to evaluate the appropriateness of a response by armed force to such an
attack.
9. Such considerations continue to be at issue at the highest levels of national secur-
ity decision-making. See John T. Bennett, Renuart: New President Faces Cyber,
Arctic Threats, DEFENSE NEWS, Aug. 20, 2008, http://www.defensenews.com/
story.php?i=3684947&c=AME&s=TOP ("As the federal government continues ef-
forts to piece together how to implement President George W. Bush's super-se-
cret, multibillion-dollar cyber security program, Air Force Gen. Victor Renuart,
U.S. Northern command chief, says success in the electronic domain will require
'a multi-nation approach.' It is difficult to determine whether an attack on a na-
tion's cyber infrastructure is an act of war because 'we have not yet defined what
that is,' Renuart said. 'That's a policy decision that has to be made. I don't think
any nation is ready to make that kind of declaration .... ").
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optimal way to get the information under the stress and time pressure
of an actual incident.
Looking ahead, it may be wise to build systems explicitly designed
to obtain data to make this determination, and which can archive the
decision-making process and rationale. As we have seen in the kinetic
dimension,1o we can almost be certain that cyber operations will be
subject to exhaustive after-the-fact examinations aimed at accounta-
bility if things go awry-as will certainly be the case at some point.
On a related matter, if we are ever going to normalize cyberwar in
the warfighting commander's toolkit, we are going to need robust sys-
tems that model the effects of a particular cyber technique.11 We need
this capability for two reasons; one is to help determine whether a
cyber activity conducted by us, or against us, fulfills the Schmitt test
so as to constitute the equivalent of a kinetic attack. As discussed,
very different legal regimes flow from that critical, threshold
determination.
If it equates to a kinetic strike against us, we then know we are
likely free to conduct a national security response-whether that be
diplomatic, economic, or military-as opposed to a law enforcement
reaction. Similarly, if we are contemplating a cyber action that
equates to a kinetic strike, a modeling capability will provide essential
data to a decision-maker who must understand the effects in order to
conduct a proportionality analysis, traditionally required under the
law of war. 12
10. Consider, for example, the attack on the Al Firdos bunker in 1991, when Ameri-
can aircraft dropped two 2,000 lb bombs on a hardened shelter. Despite clear
indications of Iraqi leadership utilizing the bunker, many Iraqi civilians died or
were injured in the attack. As a result, the basis for the American attack on the
facility was closely and carefully scrutinized at the highest levels of government.
See generally William Arkin, The Battle for Hearts and Minds, WASH. POST,
1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/fogofwar/vignettes/
v8.htm.
11. Such computer models would simulate how a particular type of attack would im-
pact specific parts of cyber and physical infrastructure, as well as second- and
third-order effects of such an attack.
12. The proportionality test is critical to assessing the legality of armed attacks. It
embodies a balancing test whereby parties engaged in a conflict must evaluate
whether civilian harm from an attack outweighs anticipated military advantages.
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art.
51(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512 [hereinafter Protocol
I] (prohibiting those attacks "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated"). The principle is stated again in Article 57(2)(a)(iii),
which requires military planners to "refrain from deciding to launch any attack
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." Id. at art.
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Of course, the analysis does not stop at the "type of attack" deter-
mination, but next moves to a level of complexity embroiled with legal,
policy, and even diplomatic entanglements. The real sticking point
these days is a policy one, that is, the level of authority required to
respond to an attack or launch a preemptory attack in light of a hostile
threat or imminent attack.
As many of you know, that authority often rests at such a high
level as to render a timely, viable response option almost impossible to
implement. The bureaucratic coordination process renders potential
cyber options too cumbersome for rapid, surgical responses. In my
view, appropriate commanders must be given authority to utilize non-
kinetic, or cyber, responses under the same rules that govern their use
of weapon systems that result in kinetic effects. This "kinetic effects
equivalency" is the "KEE" to making cyber responses a truly feasible
option for commanders.13
The thorny questions, of course, often revolve around the legal pa-
rameters for cyber activities conducted under circumstances that in-
variably fall short of those that would justify the application of law of
war principles.
Let me issue a clear warning. In the post 9/11 world, many legal
experts believed that the President's commander-in-chief authority
was readily applicable to threats presented by nontraditional actors
such as terrorists and other subnational entities, and not subject to
much in the way of other legal restraints.
In important ways, however, that concept of Presidential authority
has been restricted by the courts. The Supreme Court's decision in
Boumediene v. Bush,14 released last June, is just the latest example.
This is not to say that unilateral Presidential authority in the national
security realm has been wholly eviscerated. Rather, it simply clarifies
that the scope of that authority is more limited than some supposed.
I am particularly concerned about domestic cyber activity by the
armed forces. I am not privy to what may or may not have been the
involvement of military entities in domestic surveillance activities,
but I would warn you that anything beyond activities very explicitly
authorized by law must be avoided. You cannot be too careful here.
Apart from everything else, I believe that civilian agencies have
much more robust capability 15 than may have existed in the after-
57(2)(a)(iii). This concept is considered to reflect customary international law,
and therefore binding on states regardless of treaty obligations.
13. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
14. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (holding that a foreign national has a right to habeas
corpus relief under the United States Constitution, and that the Detainee Treat-
ment Act of 2005 is not an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus).
15. Using a Joint Interagency Task Force for Cyber could help harmonize federal
action. See 6 U.S.C. § 465 (2002). DoD was recently tasked to develop and sub-
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math of 9/11, so whatever exigency that may have existed is much
diminished. Civilian agencies can and should take the lead today.
Perhaps as, or more, important is consideration of the appropriate role
of the armed forces in our democratic society.
Our nation has made the social and political decision to rely upon
an all-volunteer force for the military element of national security.
Historically, as the Supreme Court put it, the role of the armed forces
is to "fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise."16 To-
day, however, the understanding of "war" is more complex, but I think
the traditional notion of war is the lens through which the American
people view their armed forces.
The vitality of the all-volunteer force depends upon the affection
and respect of the American people for uniformed services. In fact, a
June 2008 poll still shows the military as the institution in which the
American people have the most confidence. 17 We cannot underesti-
mate the importance of the linkage between the perception of the
armed forces as an institution of integrity, and the disposition of
America's mothers and fathers to encourage their sons and daughters
to serve, not to mention the inclination of the best and brightest of our
young people to spend the flower of their youth in uniform.
Nevertheless, America's positive image of our military is fragile
and, actually, not really part of our heritage. Our founding fathers
would be horrified at the size of today's standing military. It was not
the structure they wanted.'s In fact, throughout our history the
American people have been, at best, ambivalent towards the profes-
sional military. It is only with the onset of the Cold War with the over-
arching Soviet nuclear threat that a sizable "peacetime" military was
tolerated.
What I am trying to say is that any kind of domestic activity cre-
ates great risk to the reputation of the armed forces-a reputation it
needs to sustain the domestic support it must have to maintain itself
mit to Congress a plan to improve and reform the Department's participation in,
and contribution to, the interagency coordination process on national security is-
sues. See Pub. L. No. 110-181 § 952, 122 Stat. 3 (2008).
16. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
17. Jeffrey M. Jones, Confidence in Congress: Lowest Ever for Any U.S. Institution
(2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/108142/Confidence-Congress-Lowest-Ever-
Any-US-Institution.aspx.
18. See, e.g. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (1789), http://etext.
virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeffl480.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) ("There
are instruments so dangerous to the rights of the nation and which place them so
totally at the mercy of their governors that those governors, whether legislative
or executive, should be restrained from keeping such instruments on foot but in
well-defined cases. Such an instrument is a standing army."); see also, Allan R.
Milett, The Constitution and the Citizen Soldier, in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1989, 97-104 (Richard H.
Kohn, ed. 1991).
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as the world's premier military. There are almost no models in recent
history where armed forces have been used for internal security pur-
poses over extended periods that have been healthy for a democracy
or, for that matter, good for the warfighting ability of military.
Importantly, there is perhaps no other society on earth that is
more conscious of individual rights-to include privacy rights-than
this country. And Americans guard their rights jealously, as should
be the case. Thus, if people get the idea that the military is poking
around in their private matters, reading their e-mails, and listening to
their phone calls, the potential for resentment is huge.
If you doubt me on this, consider how Americans are insisting upon
a panopoly of rights for the detainees of Guantanamo. 19 This is not
sympathy for the terrorists themselves, but instead a concern for what
our citizens perceive as affronts to rights they understandably believe
define the American way of life. 20 Consequently, imagine if you will,
their reaction if they perceive the military as part of a process that is
anything other than scrupulously adherent to American law and
values.
I do not at all dismiss the risk our adversaries pose to innocent
Americans. Yet, we must recognize that our society readily pays an
enormous price for personal freedom.
Consider that far more Americans have been killed in traffic acci-
dents than by terrorists or insurgents since 9/11.21 Consider also that
in 2005, over 30,000 people in this country were killed by guns.2 2 Yet,
to date, this country has not imposed draconian restrictions on driving
or gun rights. In short, we must not assume that Americans are will-
ing to sacrifice their privacy and personal rights on the altar of
security.
19. Criticisms of the United States' treatment of Guantanamo detainees abound
among many civil rights groups. See generally Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.
org/doc/?t=usa-antiterror (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (containing multiple com-
mentaries critical of Guantanamo detainees' treatment); Amnesty International,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/counter-terror-with-justice (last visited Jan. 15, 2009)
(containing similar commentaries); American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.
aclu.org/safefree/detention/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
20. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
21. For OIF/OEF fatality totals see OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM & IRAQI FREE-
DOM CASULATY SUMMARY BY STATE (2009), http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/
CASUALTY/STATEOEFOIF.pdf. For statistics on US traffic fatalities from
1994 through 2006 see Fatality Analysis Reporting System, http://www-fars.
nhtsa.dot.govfMain/index.aspx. The latest traffic fatality rates in the United
States can be viewed at Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Traffic Safety Facts
(2008), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811017.pdf.
22. Hsiang-Ching Kung et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2005, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP.,
Apr. 24, 2008, at 10, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr
56_10.pdf.
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What I am suggesting is that it behooves the military in a free soci-
ety to remain externally focused,23 and I say that well aware of the
borderless nature of cyberspace. That is why I believe that while we
are developing a wide variety of technical tools and capabilities, their
reach-to include their second and third order effects-must be fully
understood before their employment.
For example, as recently as June the Washington Post had a cover
story detailing the resurgence of Al Qaeda's web-based activities. 2 4
Under the law of war, there is nothing inherently wrong with destroy-
ing or distorting an adversaries' communication system.
Parenthetically, I am not among those who throw up their hands in
despair at the challenge of impacting thousands of sites. Airmen have
a long history of servicing thousands of targets over the course of an
air campaign, so in my view, as an airman, doing so in the cyber realm
is not quite as daunting as others may think.
Conceptually, however, it is one thing to attack an adversary's
command and control capability, or to exploit their websites for intelli-
gence purposes where there are ongoing combat operations, but quite
another to attack their ideological message. The central legal and
strategic issue is how do you focus your cyber activity specifically on
the target? If you cannot do that, what is the effect on innocents?
For example, if we manipulate the website of an adversary so as to
drive him to unproductive behaviors, or distort his message so as to
unnerve his followers, what is our responsibility if that distortion is
rebroadcast in some way back to the American people, as easily could
be the case?
Suppose, for example, we manipulated cyber images to make it ap-
pear that an enemy leader was ordering an attack on a U.S. facility,
and did so in order to flush his followers assembling for the attack
onto a specific location of our choosing so we could destroy them.
There is a clear military interest in doing so, but it may also have
political implications on the American electorate. Specifically, such
manipulated images of the enemy leader may have the effect of stiff-
ening domestic political resolve that may be flagging in a given con-
flict. Determining the "rules of engagement," so to speak, for such
activities is one of the main challenges for cyber-warriors.
23. See Richard H. Kohn, Posse Comitatus: Using the Military at Home: Yesterday,
Today, and Tomorrow, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 165, 182-83 (2003) ("[Rlegular armed
forces need to face outward, against American enemies, rather than inward
where a military force can become an institution acting on behalf of one part of
the community against another. That corrodes the morale of the forces, harms
recruiting, reduces readiness, undermines the support of the country for the
armed forces, and ultimately drives a wedge between the military and society.").
24. Craig Whitlock, Al-Qaeda's Growing Online Offensive, WASH. POST, June 24,
2008, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2008/06/23/AR2008062302135_pf.html.
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Along these lines, I personally am increasingly convinced that the
belligerent-today and in the future-with the most robust capability
to determine the authenticity of information in our digitized world is
the belligerent with a significant asymmetric advantage in cyberwar.
As you can tell, I am very wary of cyber modalities that cannot be
limited to those who are "adversaries," within the meaning of tradi-
tional law of war. Where you are operating in environments not
clearly within that realm, you are likely in what might be called a
"law enforcement" legal regime. That regime does suffer legal
impediments.
While I do not favor attempting to alter the law of war in some way
to facilitate cyberwar, (an effort, I would argue, that would result in
even more restraints) we do nevertheless need improved international
cooperation to create legal architecture to better address the level of
cyber activities not falling into the category where established law of
war processes readily apply.
I know that any mention of the "law enforcement" regime causes
cyber-warriors to grimace. As complicated and time consuming it may
be, I think at this moment in history it is prudent for the U.S. to take a
measured, collaborative approach with partner nations whenever pos-
sible. Otherwise, we risk having nations around the world individu-
ally, or collectively, raising new legal barriers.
While I recognize that nation-states may well be engaging in low-
level activities and probes in order to prepare for what may be a major
attack at some point, we should not necessarily conceive of the role of
the military to address every attempted intrusion. It may well be pru-
dent, for many reasons, to support civilian law enforcement agencies
as the first line of defense for such probes, even for cyber actions
aimed at domestic military facilities.
Quite candidly, I disagree with the "WarGames" 2 5 notion of the
teenage hacker able to cause catastrophic damage from the computer
in his bedroom. Some years ago, there may have been a "window of
opportunity" where such scenarios might have occurred, but much has
happened in the interim.
Yes, a terrorist might be able to manipulate this or that computer
to deadly effect. However, only a nation-state, in my judgment, could
cause the kind of debilitating damage that would equate to defeat in
war. Accordingly, focus on that high-end threat does engender a set of
legal issues under the law of war, but they are issues that play them-
selves out on mainly familiar legal ground.
I do have an observation for cyber-warriors. We will never be able
to operationalize cyberspace to the same extent as has been done with
the air weapon, absent a renewed effort to reduce the classification
25. WARGAmFs (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1983).
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levels. Having been read into some cyber programs, it is remarkable
how unremarkable they are relative to kinetic operations that are de-
signed to achieve the same effects, but do not have the requirement for
stratospheric clearances.
I sometimes think that classification levels are as much about rice
bowls26 and program control as they are about actual security needs.
Regardless, the point is that reform and, perhaps, some risk assump-
tion is necessary to fully socialize the idea of cyberspace operations.
Finally, as I indicated previously, while I am not keen on seeking
to revise the law of war, per se, it may be the right time to consider
strengthening the international legal norms related to cyber activi-
ties, especially those applicable in peacetime.
That said, I recognize those who believe that we should instead
seek maximum flexibility, and be wary of any agreements that may
result in tying our own hands. My personal view is that sometimes
creating international norms for peacetime activities, especially
through treaty law, gains favor in bipolar or multipolar worlds.
With respect to that, what is in the realm of the realistic? The
seeds of collaboration are already scattered, for example in the Con-
vention on Cybercrime ratified by the United States in 2006,27 and in
fragmentary restrictions scattered through other bodies of interna-
tional law.
Whether consolidated in a unitary convention or strengthened in
existing regimes, the scope of protections available is limited only by
the imagination and the need for agreement. Possibilities offered by a
number of people include:
* Reaffirming the sanctity of communications relay systems, in-
cluding those in space-a regime begun under the Hague Conven-
tion of 1907 and elaborated upon under the International
Telecommunications Union ("ITU");28
0 Strengthening protections for communications systems and
stations-elements of which can be found within the ITU and the
Law of the Sea Convention;29
26. In military culture, the term "rice bowl" refers to a "jealously protected program,
project, department, or budget; a fiefdom." Double Tongued Dictionary, http:l
www.doubletongued.org/index.php/dictionary/rice-bow]! (last visited Jan. 15,
2009).
27. Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/enfreaties/Htmlll85.htm [herein-
after Cybercrime].
28. Int'l Telecomms. Union, Cybersecurity for All: ITU's Work for a Safer World
(2007), available at httpJ/www.itu.int/dms-pub/itu-s/opb/gen/S-GEN-CYBER-
2007-PDF-E.pdf.
29. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1883
U.N.T.S. 397.
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* Reinforcing the sanctity of navigational tools such as Tactical
Air Navigation ("TACAN")30 and the Global Positioning System
("GPS"),31 including systems both terrestrial and those in space-a
regime supported by the Chicago Convention32 and International
Civil Aviation Organization;
* Reaffirming the sanctity of arms control verification tools, espe-
cially those in space-a regime established through multiple arms
control agreements;33
* Protecting supervisory control and data acquisition ("SCADA")
systems that control critical infrastructure like dams, pipelines,
and nuclear reactors; 34
* Providing prohibitions and consequences for economic
espionage;35
* Agreements to cooperate in cyber criminal investigations
modeled on mutual legal assistance treaties ("MLATs") or the
Cybercrime convention; 3 6
* Creation of a tracking and logging regime to strip the anonym-
ity of global hackers, much the way tracking materials can be em-
bedded in high explosives to identify their origin;37
* Baseline speech restrictions-for example rules against terror-
ist incitement, bomb building instructions, exchange of computer
network attack programs, and so forth-so long as such rules com-
ply with domestic laws, such as the U.S. First Amendment;3 8
30. See generally Tactical Air Navigation, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TACAN (last
visited Jan. 15, 2009).
31. See generally Global Positioning System: Serving the World, http://www.gps.gov/
(last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
32. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, http://www.icao.int/
icaonet/dcs/7300.html.
33. Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activity of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
2967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 207-208.
34. Brian T. O'Donnell & James C. Kraska, Humanitarian Law: Developing Interna-
tional Rules of the Digital Battlefield, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 133, 157-58
(2003) (discussing importance of developing technology systems to protect na-
tion's infrastructure).
35. Susan W. Brenner & Anthony C. Crescenzi, State-Sponsored Crime: The Futility
of the Economic Espionage Act 28 Hous. J. INT'L L. 389, 447-51 (2006) (noting
that as economic espionage enters cyberspace it becomes even more resistant to
traditional law enforcement methods).
36. Cybercrime, supra note 27.
37. 27 C.F.R. 555.109 (2005), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/05-
10618.htm (requiring manufacturers to place identifying marks on explosive
materials for sale or distribution).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Serious consideration could be given to each provision to determine
whether derogation should be permitted during international armed
conflict, and if so, what notification or protection regimes might be
required to avoid collateral civilian consequences.
For those provisions that are derogable, 3 9 the DoD could continue
to groom trained and equipped cyber-warriors ready to unleash ki-
netic and cyber effects upon the enemy. Certainly, there is evidence
other nations are undertaking similar efforts. 40
Cyberspace has evolved beyond the imagination of most in the last
fifteen years to the point that science fiction has become more science
than fiction.41 But it stands on a precarious foundation that could be
shaken by a cyber 9/11 or cyber Pearl Harbor. Who has forgotten that
after 9/11 the skies were emptied of aviation? Who has suffered
39. A non-derogable provision of a treaty may not be violated or suspended under any
circumstance. In contrast, under some human rights treaties, a state can for-
mally file a notice of derogation for derogable rights during a state of emergency.
See e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(1), Mar. 23,
1976, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
40. See, e.g., 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 22 (declaring spe-
cifically that "China is developing technologies to disrupt our traditional advan-
tages. Examples include development of anti-satellite capabilities and cyber
warfare."). Such a perspective is not new. See John A. Serabian, Jr., Info. Opera-
tions Issue Manager, CIA, Statement for the Record Before the Joint Economic
Committee on Cyber Threats and the U.S. Economy (Feb. 23, 2000), https://www.
cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2000/cyberthreats_022300.html
("We are detecting, with increasing frequency, the appearance of doctrine and
dedicated offensive cyber warfare programs in other countries. We have identi-
fied several, based on all-source intelligence information, that are pursuing gov-
ernment-sponsored offensive cyber programs. Foreign nations have begun to
include information warfare in their military doctrine, as well as their war col-
lege curricula, with respect to both defensive and offensive applications. They
are developing strategies and tools to conduct information attacks. Those nations
developing cyber programs recognize the value of attacking adversary computer
systems, both on the military and domestic front. Just as foreign governments
and the military services have long emphasized the need to disrupt the flow of
information in combat situations, they now stress the power of cyber warfare
when targeted against civilian infrastructures, particularly those that could sup-
port military strategy.").
41. For example, cyber techniques were apparently used before and during the 2008
conflict in Georgia. See David Ho, Web Sites Hit As War Uses Bytes and Bullets,
ATLANTA J.-CONsT., Aug. 15, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.ajc.com/metro/
content/printedition/2008/08/15/cyberwar.html ("As Russian tanks roll through
Georgia, the assault is continuing in another realm: cyberspace, where hackers
are waging war on Georgian Web sites, e-mail and communication services.
About 20 Georgian government, banking and media sites were offline Thursday,
said Scott Borg, director of the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, an independent
research group that advises the government. Some sites have fled to hosting
computers elsewhere . . . but are continuing to take digital fire. The ongoing
online battle, which appears to have begun before the first shots were fired, is a
preview of a new era in warfare-one for which the United States is not ready,
government officials and security experts say.").
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through an extended blackout or loss of water? Who has contemplated
the impact of a fuel shock on the global economy, especially as gas
passes $4.00 per gallon? Cyberspace is as vital as those resources and
intimately connected to them as well.
For that reason I say again, welcome cyber-warriors; especially
cyber-defenders. Our nation's future depends on you.
